The determinants of investment, input use, and productivity are investigated under customary tenure in peri-urban areas of the Gambia. A structural model is specified to investigate the role of tenure security on farm investments and input use and thereby on yield. Testing of the structural form hypotheses requires simultaneous equation estimation. Containing both continuous and discrete endogenous variables, the model is estimated as a feasible generalized least squares Amemiya's generalized probit. Some of the positive relationships hypothesized between tenure security, investment, and yields are corroborated. In particular, tenure security is found to enhance longterm investments, which in turn enhance yields.
Much of the land tenure literature on sub-Saharan Africa concerns the hypothesis that tenure insecurity has a negative impact upon the propensity to invest in land improvements. Indigenous land tenure systems, under which farmers often do not hold title to the land they cultivate, have been charged with failing to provide farmers with adequate incentives or means to make land improvements or adopt new technologies that could enhance production efficiency (Parsons, Johnson, Harrison) . Barrows and Roth, Eastman, and Feder and Noronha take exception to this view; they emphasize the evolutionary nature of indigenous land tenure systems, pointing out that they have adapted to external influences (e.g., colonialism, population growth, cash cropping) in the past and are continuing to do so. Place and Hazell conclude that lack of credit access, insufficient human capital, and labor shortages
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adversely affect investment decisions more often than tenure insecurity. The question remains whether customary tenure systems provide adequate tenure security to motivate the investment in land and the use of inputs necessary for increased production in the face of population growth and urbanization in sub-Saharan Africa.
A study of three villages in the peri-urban area of the Gambia, an area of increasing land scarcity, was undertaken to look at the impact of customary tenure arrangements on agricultural productivity. The study measures the impacts of different levels of tenure security on farm investment, input use, and yield in order to examine the role of tenure security in increasing agricultural production. The analysis draws on the theoretical framework of Feder; the rights-based tenure security variables constructed by Place and Hazell; and the diversity of tenure security variables employed by Roth, Cochrane, and Kisamba-Mugerwa (1993) . These relationships are specified as a system of equations. Previous work estimated reducedform equations which did not test the structural form linkages between tenure security and productivity, or if structural form equations were estimated, simultaneity bias was ignored, resulting in hypothesis tests based on inconsistent parameter estimates.
In this paper we present an advance in the study of the linkages between tenure security and productivity by estimating a structural model which allows explicit testing of the impact of tenure security on productivity through its role on investment. These tests are based on consistent and the most asymptotically efficient coefficient estimates. Since the system includes both discrete and continuous dependent variables, it is estimated using Amemiya's generalized probit (GP) feasible generalized least squares.
These relationships are analyzed using a survey of 120 households in three villages within close proximity to the cities of Banjul and Serekunda, in the western division of the Gambia. Data include household, plot manager, and plot-level characteristics, and explicit account is taken of the relationships between tenure security and the choice variables measuring land investments, variable input use, and yield. Some of the hypothesized positive relationships between tenure security, investment, and yields are corroborated by the analysis. In particular, positive relationships are observed between tenure security, the propensity to make longterm land improvements, and the presence of trees on a plot. Long-term land improvements are found to enhance yield.
A Model of Tenure Security, Investment, and Productivity Feder and Onchan formally develop Feder's framework of investment and tenure security as an optimization problem. Tenure insecurity is represented by the probability of being evicted from one's land. The farmer chooses between investments in capital equipment, which is not lost in the event of eviction; land improvements, which are completely lost in an eviction; and nonagricultural activities and assets, which are unaffected by eviction. The farmer invests in the first period and produces in the second, with the objective of maximizing expected terminal wealth at the end of the second period. Terminal wealth consists of production value, land value, and returns to nonagricultural activities, less any debts incurred through credit use. The first-order conditions for a maximum yield the following structural form equations used by Place and Hazell: (X, L, l) where credit (C), land improvements (L), variable inputs (l) , and yield (Y) are endogenous variables, tenure security (TS) is exogenous, and X represents exogenous characteristics of the farm and its cultivator(s). This system of equations is recursive in the sense of the model structure, not necessarily temporally. That is, tenure security indirectly affects productivity through investment. Feder used this framework to examine the relationship between land title, yield, and inputs in three provinces in Thailand. However, by using a reduced-form specification, he was unable to test the structural form hypotheses suggested by the theoretical framework motivating it. That is, tests on the reduced-form parameters are not equivalent to structural form tests.
Feder and Onchan also estimate the reducedform equations using Feder's data. Since no relationship was specified between farm investments and yield, the authors' conclusion that title will lead to higher productivity is questionable. Similarly, the assertion that insecure tenure will induce farmers to shift resources into off-farm activities or consumption was not tested empirically.
Migot-Adholla, Hazell, and Place, and Place and Hazell adopted a variation of Feder's system for their econometric work in Kenya, Ghana, and Rwanda. Their studies were innovati ve in their attempt to control for parcel, household, and village characteristics and for their use of lexicographic transfer rights bundles to create tenure categories. However, the reducedform equations do not permit an examination of the structural relationships between land rights, investments, inputs, and yield. Another shortcoming is the assumption that all decision making is made by the household head, prohibiting the use of information on individual plot managers within the household. Kisamba-Mugerwa (1993, 1994) , in their study of Rukungiri District, Uganda, consider the role of title in promoting farm investments. The authors conclude that farmers value land registration and suggest that the process be simplified to allow more farmers to register their land.
The conceptual model employed here draws from Feder. Key differences are that three types of investments are considered here, and that the supply-side link between credit access, tenure security, and investments/inputs is omitted. Credit access in rural Gambia rarely depends on the use of land as collateral, and loans are infrequently (less than 3%) used for agricultural purposes. Thus tenure security affects investment mainly through the demand side-that is, through the assurance that the returns of investments will accrue to those who make investments.
Following Place and Hazell, tenure security is measured based on whether the plot manager believes he or she has complete transfer rights (the right to sell the land). The investments considered are grouped into three types: longterm or fixed improvements (wells and fences), fruit trees, and medium-term soil improvements (manuring and fallowing). Long-and mediumterm improvements are thought to be complementary, and both of these are considered to affect the use of variable inputs.
The structural model employed here takes its inspiration from that of Place and Hazell and Migot-Adholla, Hazell, and Place, and can be written as the following system: The level of observation is the plot level, with household and plot manager characteristics in X being the same for those with multiple plots. Why tenure security is exogenous in this model is an important point. In many places in Africa, long-term investments are means of enhancing tenure security. However in the Gambia, tenure security is dependent on the form of acquisition, which in turn is dependent upon factors beyond the control of the individual. Ninety percent of the plots in the study are either borrowed land, inherited, or are given as a gift of the village chief (alkalo). Borrowed land tends to confer only use rights, while in-herited land tends to confer complete transfer rights. The only fixed "investments" that conferred land rights were clearing land, which, given that the land had been cleared for between thirty and one hundred years, was not an issue in this study (Roth, Carr, and Cochrane) .
Founding families are three times as likely to inherit land, while nonfounding families are 50% more likely to borrow land (Hayes) . Mostly females borrow land (about 69%; see Roth, Carr, and Cochrane) . Thus, access to land is often determined by one's birth and gender or by the death of one's relatives, all of which are (generally) beyond the control of the individual. Sale of land is infrequent; it occurs in less than 5% of the plots, and it occurs mostly in Sinchu-which is the location nearest an urban area-for the purpose of building a residence. Most purchases are from the village chief, and only the improvements on the land are transferred through sale, not the land itself (Roth, Carr, and Cochrane) . Given that mode of acquisition generally determines land rights, and that mode of acquisition is determined by factors generally beyond the control of the individual, customary land rights in the Gambia can be considered exogenous.
The structural model, equations (5)- (9), differs from its predecessors in three important ways. First, it is estimated as a structural model using simultaneous equations methods. This means that not only can the explicit structural form hypotheses be tested, but they are done so with consistent and the most asymptotically efficient two-stage estimators available. All previous work has either tested the reduced-form hypotheses or has tested hypotheses using biased and inconsistent parameter estimates, which invalidate the test results.
Second, there is no direct link between tenure security and variable inputs in this model. In the Place and Hazell and Migot-Adholla, Hazell, and Place versions, tenure security affects variable input use because of improved access to cheaper (institutional) credit. Since this scenario is not relevant in the Gambian context, tenure security affects variable input use only indirectly through its impact on investments. Less than 3% of all credit is used for farm inputs and equipment, with over 75% of all credit being used for social obligations or other nonproductive activities. Nearly 70% of the credit is unsecured with collateral, while 28% is secured with reciprocal loan obligations (Roth, Carr, and Cochrane) . Clearly, credit is rarely used in the Gambia for agriculture and the nature of its use in nonproductive activities indicates that cash is not fungible between activities. Therefore, credit is not included in the model. Third, the exogenous variables, X, comprise characteristics of the plot, its manager, the manager's household, and the village site in which it is located. This differentiation into four levels of observation, and especially the distinction between characteristics of the plot manager and those of his or her household should provide a more detailed dissection of decision making.
The Generalized Probit Model
Equations (5) through (9) represent a recursive! structural form system of equations. Since the model contains both discrete and continuous dependent variables, consistent parameter estimates cannot be obtained using the classical simultaneous equation model. Amemiya derives a way to recover consistent estimates of the structural form coefficients from the reducedform coefficients that takes into account the cross-equation relationships and is therefore asymptotically more efficient than Heckman's approach. Referred to as generalized probit (GP), Amemiya shows that the following relationship exists between the reduced-and structural-form coefficients:
where 1t k is an M by 1 vector of reduced-form coefficients in the kth equation, J k is an M by m, matrix of ones and zeroes such that XJ k = X k , X is an N by M matrix of all exogenous variables in the system, X k is an N by m, matrix of exogenous variables in the kth equation,~k is an m, by 1 vector of structural-form coefficients corresponding to the exogenous variables in the kth equation, 1t k * is an M by m, matrix of the reduced-form parameters associated with the endogenous variables in the kth structuralform equation, and ' Yk is a k* by 1 vector of structural-form coefficients corresponding to the right-hand side endogenous variables in the kth equation. This relationship between the reduced-form and structural-form parameters is used to estimate the structural-form parameters. Let it k be consistent estimates of 1t k (derived, for instance, from probit or least squares estimations of the reduced-form equations for la-I Recursive is used in the sense of model structure, not temporally. tent or continuous dependent variables, respectively). Then
Yk is an M by 1 vector. In other words, the estimated reducedform coefficients and the J matrix are used as dependent and independent variables. The form of 11k allows it to function as an error term and thus allows equation (11) to function as a regression equation to recover the desired structural parameters via least squares techniques.
Estimation of the model using feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) also produces consistent estimates which are asymptotically more efficient than both those generated by OLS generalized probit or Heckman's approach (Lee) . The appropriate covariance matrix for each equation, Qk' is introduced in Amemiya and discussed in Zepeda. Amemiya's GP FGLS is estimated in stages since it requires GP OLS estimates of the structural parameters to construct a covariance matrix. Consolidating the explanatory variables and the parameters in equation (11) Survey Data of a Peri-Urban Region of the Gambia Data for this study were collected as part of the peri-urban project undertaken in by the University of Wisconsin's Land Tenure Center (LTC) and the Institute for Development Anthropology (IDA). A detailed description of householdand individual-level production, employment, income, land transfers, and land rights in the three sites is presented in Roth, Carr, and Cochrane. The survey of forty randomly selected households in each site was carried out during March and April of 1993 (Roth) . The resulting data set provides disaggregated information about individual plot managers and the physical characteristics of their landholdings. For the 120 households, there are observations on 296 plot managers and over 600 major plots." Families in these villages were invited to clear land between the late 1800s and mid 1960s and, by right of settlement, they and their descendants have come to be recognized as village founding families with preferential rights of cultivation and exclusion. More recent arrivals generally solicit land from the chief or founding families and may be granted land rights as robust as the founding families if they demonstrate a willingness to settle permanently. A common situation emerging with land scarcity is that plots are borrowed seasonally. Borrowers have usufruct rights which are renewed annually. Thus, land rights are highly dependent on the form of acquisition, which is largely beyond the control of the individual.
Sinchu and Pirang both represent relatively land-scarce, dynamic environments, with the former more oriented toward off-farm labor prospects and the latter toward horticultural opportunities and rice. Sanyang represents a relatively land-abundant settlement more dependent upon traditional agricultural income sources. Sinchu was settled thirty to sixty years ago and it is located near a city, Serekunda, whose inhabitants seek land from the alkalo for residences. Sanyang was settled seventy-five years ago and Pirang even earlier. Both are located the same distance from Serekunda, but a paved road connects Pirang, where requests to borrow land are less frequent than Sinchu, but more frequent than Sanyang. (Roth, Carr, and Cochrane) There are 267 households in Sinchu, 123 in Pirang, and 417 in Sanyang. Of these, 40 households were surveyed in each village. In Sinchu, the mean household size is 8.8, the mean number of crop plots is 3.7, and the total farm area per household is 0.95 hectares.' In Pirang, the mean household size is 10.2, the mean number of crop plots is 3.5, with a total farm size per household of 1.4 hectares. In Sanyang, the mean household size is 11.7, the mean number of crop plots is 3.3, and the total farm size is 2.15 hectares per household. (Roth, Carr, and Cochrane) .
Land use is similar in all three villages. The exception is that rice is not grown in Sinchu. Land use is strongly correlated with plot location and gender. Compound land, where extended families reside, is used to grow vegetables, cassava, maize, or fruit trees. Inner fields, like compound plots, are usually very fertile due to applications of household waste and livestock tethering, and they are used for vegetables, maize, and fruit trees. Fruit trees are grown by men, while women are primarily responsible for vegetable cultivation. Outside the concentric ring of inner fields lie the upland fields which men use to grow maize, millet, sorghum, and groundnut. Women may also grow groundnut on upland fields and rice in swamp land.
Data from the survey are used to construct variables to estimate the system of equations (5)-(9). Table 1 contains a list and descriptive statistics on the variables used. The unit of observation is the plot level; hence, plot manager characteristics are the same for multiple plots worked by a single plot manager, as are household characteristics for all plots worked within a single household.
There are three binary endogenous variables. The variable LANDIMP indicates whether the current plot manager had made long-term improvements (either a well or fence) on the plot in question. The variable TREES_YN equals one if one or more trees (mango, orange, lime, cashew, and "other") appeared on the plot, and zero otherwise." The variable LANDMNG represents medium-term investments and equals one if the plot was in fallow during the 1991-92 season or whether a tethered herd had manured the plot for the past three consecutive years or for the three months prior to planting.
The continuous endogenous variables include FARMCOST and YIELDPRO. The costs (in Dalassi) of chemical fertilizers, pesticides, mechanical and animal traction, seeds, and other inputs were added together to create an aggregate measure of input use, FARMCOST. The value of fruit, crops, and vegetables produced on each plot-regardless of eventual dispensation-are added together and divided by plot area (in hectares) to define overall yield or YIELDPRO.
Tenure security is measured by asking each plot manager his or her perceived rights associated with each plot. These bundles of land rights can be categorized following Place and Hazell, as complete, including the right to rent or sell the land (COMTRANS); preferential, including the right to bequeath the land (PRETRANS); and lim- 
LIMTRANS).
Complete rights include preferential and use rights, while preferential rights include use rights. Data in the sample show a nearly lexicographic relationship between less-common and more-common rights (Hayes) . For example, all plot managers that perceived the right to sell also perceived possession of every other transfer and use right, suggesting a good proxy for a complete set of rights. As discussed above, land use rights are highly correlated with form of acquisition, which is overwhelmingly (90%) through customary means (birth, death, borrowing) and dependent upon gender and family status. Since the individual has no control over these, land use rights are considered exogenous. Exogenous variables measuring household-, plot manager-, and plot-level characteristics are included in each equation, both to control for these characteristics while observing tenure-investment-productivity relationships and to examine these characteristics' own effects on investment and productivity. There are also dummy variables for SINCHU and SANYANG, two of the three survey sites, representing the two extremes on the continuum of land scarcity, proximity to urban centers, and land market activity. Household variables include measures of wealth, diversity of income, and labor resources.
Wealth is an index created by factor analysis (Norusis) to identify assets which contribute to the unobservable factor of "wealth." It is estimated as a function of the presence of agricultural equipment and large animals (cart, plow, seeder, donkeys, sheep, and cattle). Household items such as stoves, housing materials, and some small animals did not contribute to explaining the resulting wealth index.
A shortcoming of the survey is the binary treatment of labor use. Plot managers were asked the type of wage labor used and the total amount paid in wages, but not the amount of labor. The type of household labor used was also asked, but since no quantity information was collected and no explicit wage is paid to household labor, there is no measure for the total amount of household labor expended. Thus, there is no aggregate measure of labor used on a given plot.
Plot manager characteristics include sex, wages, and remittances received by the plot manager, the size of all land in hectares currently controlled by a single plot manager, and the degree of farm fragmentation as measured by the Simpson index. The index ranges from zero (complete consolidation: the farmer controls only one plot) to one (complete fragmentation: the farmer manages an infinite number of tiny plots).
Plot-level characteristics include location variables indicating whether a plot is located in or near the compound, or in the outer fields or bush. Other characteristics are a measure of plot fertility, the existence of prior investments in fences or wells, and plot size. Dummy variables are included to control for and examine the effects of different crop choices upon investments and yield. They include private and donor gardens, rice, groundnut, and residences.
Results
Equations (5)- (9), specifying the relationships between tenure security, investment, input use, and yield, were estimated using Gaussx 3.1 software (Breslaw) and with the 567 observations on plots for which complete information was available. Probit analysis and ordinary least squares are used to estimate the reduced-
Tenure Security in Gambian Agriculture 375
form coefficients. The remainder of the estimations-generalized probit coefficients, covariance matrices, goodness-of-fit measures, and hypothesis tests-were carried out using Gauss 3.1 commands within the Gaussx framework (Hayes) . Prediction tables for the latent dependent variables were constructed using the original data and a threshold for the predicted values. R 2 values can be calculated from the GP FGLS estimates in equation (12), but it is less informative to examine fit of the structural model for the latent variables.
Long-Term Land Improvements
The long-term improvements equation (5) shows a fairly good fit, as measured by prediction accuracy. The model correctly predicts 84.0% of the dependent variable, with a majority in each category correctly predicted. The model's parameter estimates are presented in table 2.
Secure tenure, represented by complete transfer rights, is found to positively and significantly affect the propensity to make fixed investments. The marginal effect on the probability of making fixed investments on a given plot evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables is 0.115. The coefficient for preferential transfer rights is not statistically significant.
Both Sinchu and Sanyang show negative and significant coefficients. Sinchu's somewhat more active land market (19% of all plots versus less than 1%) and the recent influx of migrants may have worsened the prospects for remaining on one's land, thereby decreasing the propensity to invest. Land is mostly sold by the alkalo for residential purposes, and only the improvements are transferred for sale, not the land itself (Roth, Carr, and Carter) . Given the demand for land and that much of the land used is borrowed from the alkalo, individuals in Sinchu may be reluctant to invest in agricultural improvements for fear that the alkalo will reclaim their land to sell to others. Sanyang, although it enjoys more abundant and accessible land than Sinchu, relies more heavily on upland, rainfed agriculture than do the other villages; its farmers would therefore be less likely to invest in wells.
The positive coefficient for wealth appears to support the reasoning that greater holdings of wealth in livestock and agricultural equipment signal greater access to materials for land improvements. Farm size is also positively and significantly associated with land improvements. A larger farm would be expected to gen- erate a greater marketed surplus, which could be reinvested on one of the constituent plots.
Neither gender nor farm fragmentation shows a significant effect. As expected, a plot's proximity to the compound has a positive effect on fixed improvements-both INCOMP and NEARCOMP have positive and significant coefficients. That wells should be located near the homestead is not surprising. And valuable lands comprising the compound are often fenced to more clearly delineate their boundaries.
The presence of a well on a plot prior to acquisition has a strong positive effect on subsequent improvements. There are two possible explanations for this. First, an existing well may need to be periodically maintained or even re-dug to prevent it from collapsing. Second, a well is likely to improve the productivity of a plot, making it more valuable and worth protecting with a fence. Thus, one might expect a farmer to be more likely to build a fence on a plot with a well on it than vice versa. This asymmetry is corroborated by the negative and significant coefficient for previously existing fencing.
The land use dummies give mixed results. Donor garden plots show the expected positive and significant effect on fixed improvements. while rice and residence plots have negative and significant effects and private gardens and groundnut plots show no significant relationship. Contrary to expectations, however, is the negative and significant sign on residence plots. However, since every residence plot in the sample is also classified as an in-compound plot, the binary variable RESIDNCE is equivalent to the difference between residences and all other in-compound plots, ceteris paribus. Notes: Single and double asterisks (*) denote significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed "t" test. Degrees of freedom = 550.
The measure of residence plots' effect vis-a-vis all other plots is the sum of the coefficients from INCOMP and RESIDNCE or 0.143. The null hypothesis that these coefficients are equal to zero cannot be rejected using a Wald statistic (0.228), and thus residence plots are no more likely than any other kind of plot, ceteris paribus, to receive fixed improvements.
Trees
The model correctly predicts trees, equation (6), 88.0% of the time, with a majority in each category correct (table 3) . Tenure security, both complete and preferential transfer rights, is positively and significantly associated with finding trees on a given plot. Evaluated at the mean explanatory variables, the respective effects of each measure of tenure security on the probability of the presence of trees are 0.212 and 0.154. Plots in land-scarce Sinchu show a significantly lower-than-average propensity to support trees, while land-rich Sanyang plots show a significantly higher-than-average chance. Farm size shows up positively and significantly associated with the presence of trees. Perhaps plot managers with more land can afford to hold some of it in trees rather than in higher-density crops or they may opt to hold more of it in trees, which require less intensive labor application than most other crops (Freudenberger) . The two location dummies-for plots in and near the compound-show positive and significant coefficients, corroborating the idea that proximity to the compound provides for more constant attention to and better supervision of fruit trees, as well as more economical transportation of fruit.
Plot fertility has a negative and significant effect on the presence of trees, suggesting perhaps that trees can make better use of marginal soils than can food or other cash crops, for which the more fertile soils are reserved.
The land use dummies included as control variables all have negative coefficients, although those for private and donor gardens are Notes: Single and double asterisks (*) denote significance at the 10% and 5% levels. respectively, in a two-tailed "t" test. Degrees of freedom = 554.
statistically insignificant. As in equation (5), residence plots have a negative coefficient, but their true effect must be evaluated in conjunction with that of in-compound plots. Thus the appropriate coefficient is 0.533. The Wald test statistic is 3.363, rejecting the null hypothesis at the 10% level. Thus, residence plots are more likely, ceteris paribus, than other kinds of plots to support trees.
Medium-Term Improvements
The model's predictive record is fairly poor for the medium-term improvements equation. Although 87.8% of the dependent variable's values are correctly predicted, this is due in large part to the correct prediction of the large majority of unimproved plots. Only five of the 70 plots with the improvements in question are correctly predicted (table 4) . Contrary to expectations, complete transfer rights have an insignificant coefficient for this equation, while preferential transfer rights show a negative and significant effect. The expected positive effect of long-term land improvements fails to appear; its coefficient is minuscule and statistically insignificant. Neither the presence of pre-acquisition wells or fences show any significant impact.
However, the exogenous, nontenure variables perform somewhat better in the model. Many of the results underscore preliminary statistical evidence suggesting that soil improvements and short-term inputs are substitutes. Land-scarce Sinchu has a negative effect on soil improvements; Sanyang's effect is positive. Sanyang's relative land abundance affords its farmers more opportunity to fallow fields and tether cows. Sinchu's relative scarcity of land and large livestock, as well as its easier access to commercial input markets, may accordingly dissuade its farmers from using traditional soil improvement methods.
As expected, wealth shows a positive and significant impact on the propensity to undertake soil improvements, reflecting the link between livestock ownership and manure supply. As expected, female plot managers are significantly less likely to undertake these improvements than are men, who control livestock herds, make tethering decisions, and are more likely to grow crops which require manuring and/or fallowing. Diversity of household income sources also appears to significantly increase the tendency to make such improvements. If diversity of income sources signals a household's movement out of agriculture and into nonfarm activities, the household's members may be more inclined (and able) to put fields in fallow or to use existing herds to manure upland fields rather than invest in commercial inputs. Remittances positively affect medium-term improvements, likely reflecting the same phenomenon observed for diversity of income sources at the household level.
Variable Inputs
Estimation of equation (8) gives only a fair fit, accounting for 26.7% of the variation in the dependent variable." Nonetheless, the two major hypotheses are confirmed (table 5) . First, postacquisition fixed improvements significantly and positively influence the use of commercial inputs. The presence of such an investment is associated, on average, with an increase of 14.93 Dalassi (1992-93 exchange rate: U.S.$1 equaled D8.30) in application of inputs-the mean value of nonzero input applications overall is DI23.47. Pre-existing fixed investments do not significantly affect the dependent variable.
Second, medium-term soil improvements are significantly and negatively associated with use of commercial inputs. Specifically, having fallowed or manured a plot prior to the cropping season results, on average, in a decrease of D25.02 in the value of commercial input application. This indicates that the medium-and short-term improvements/inputs are substitutes.
As expected, female plot managers appear to make much lower average input applications than do men. Remittances received positively affect spending on inputs. Although the coefficient is statistically significant, it is small in absolute terms; for every Dalassi received in remittances, only DO.04 is spent on commercial inputs.
Proximity to the compound appears to negatively affect the amount spent on inputs for a given plot; plots in and near the compound show negative and significant coefficients. This is expected since household waste is deposited on plots in and near the compound and serves as a substitute for commercial fertilizer. As expected, plot area is positively and significantly associated with input applications, which are not scaled by area in this estimation. Notes: Single and double asterisks (*) denote significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively, in a two-tailed "t" test. Degrees of freedom = 549.
Yield
Estimation of equation (9) accounts for 38.4% of the variation in yield. Of the four major hypotheses put forward for the yield equation, two are confirmed and two are unfulfilled by the results (table 6) . As expected, post-acquisition land improvements are positively and significantly related to higher yield. The presence of such investments is associated, on average, with an increase in yield of D6675.18 per hectare, ceteris paribus. Also as expected, the presence of trees on a plot is associated with a significantly lower yield. The presence of trees decreases yield by D2654.07, ceteris paribus. However, the coefficient for medium-term soil improvements (LANDMNG) is statistically insignificant. It is possible that LANDMNG is picking up some of the effects of omitted land use dummy variables; these improvements are undertaken most frequently on residences, orchards, and field crops, which have lower-thanaverage yields." The process of reclaiming fallowed land may also explain the negative coef-7 Of these three, only the dummy for residence plots is included. A more thorough investigation of its effect on yield through soil improvements-using an interaction term-was not undertaken because it would involve interacting an exogenous with an endogenous variable.
ficient. Clearing brush from a fallowed plot is labor-intensive and may be done over several growing seasons rather than all at once. If only part of a recently reclaimed plot is under cultivation, yet the plot's entire area is used, the resulting yield figure is artificially low.
The coefficient for commercial inputs is also statistically insignificant. This might also be attributed to the effects of omitted land use dummies since the highest applications of commercial inputs are made on those same lower-yield field crops and orchards.
Despite being imperfectly measured, household labor resources show the expected positive and significant effect on yield. Holding other variables constant, an increase of one adult equivalent to the household's labor supply is associated with an increase in yield of D534.17 per hectare. It was thought that wage labor would signal a shift of labor out of farming and thereby decrease yields; however, it has no significant effect on yield.
As expected, farm size shows a negative and significant effect upon yield, indicating perhaps that inefficiencies arise in production on larger farms. However, plot size has no significant impact on yield. Soil fertility shows a positive and significant effect on yield, as expected.
Of the ten possible land use dummy variables, only those for donor gardens and resi-dence plots were included. Inclusion of several of these variables-particularly that for private gardens-tended to present problems of multicollinearity. Donor gardens show a substantial positive relationship with yield. This was expected, given the high value of vegetables grown in these schemes and the minute plots involved. The effects of residence plots are insignificant.
Conclusions and Implications
In this study we examine the determinants of investment, input use, and productivity in agriculture under customary tenure in the peri-urban areas of Banjul and Serekunda. The purpose of this analysis is to investigate the effects of tenure security upon farm investments and input use, and thereby upon yield. Because the structural model represents a simultaneous system, it is estimated using Amemiya's generalized probit method to allow observation of the effects of both exogenous and endogenous variables without the bias introduced by joint dependency. The particular advantage of this approach is the ability to obtain statistically consistent estimates of how tenure security enters indirectly into the determination of yield through its effects on other choice variables. Previous analyses involving reduced-form (Feder and Onchan, Place and Hazell) or single-equation (Feder; Roth, Cochrane, and Kisamba-Mugerwa 1994) estimation have not allowed for explicit observation of these relationships or they yield inconsistent parameter estimates for hypothesis tests. In addition, the GP FGLS approach has the advantage of being asymptotically more efficient than all other two-stage estimation methods (Lee) .
Within the customary tenure system, there exist differing incentives for investing in land. This study has shown that more individualized rights-in particular, the right of sale and the use rights it implies-are associated with a higher propensity to make investments, which in turn has a positive effect on yields. Increasing individualization of land rights is linked to increasing agricultural production through investment, even under customary tenure. However, individualization of rights is generally determined at the time of acquisition under circumstances over which the individual has little control: gender, family status, or death of a relative. In addition, fostering further individualization of rights and the emergence of land sales proceed at the expense of communitybased obligations to lend land to nonlandholding farmers. Thus, any policy concerned with encouraging the development of land rights conducive to investments and higher yields must also concern itself with preserving widespread-if not necessarily equitable-access to land. Although the strengthening of land rights under customary tenure appears to have an important role to play in encouraging investment and productivity in Gambian agriculture, it is not likely to be effective without corresponding changes in the incentive structure posed by current prices for inputs, outputs, and labor.
The roles of medium-term soil improvement practices and short-term commercial input use are less intuitive and less clear. Tenure security appears to be negatively associated with soil improvements, which in turn seem to behave as substitutes for commercial inputs. At the same time, long-term improvements appear to encourage commercial input use. Finally, soil improvements and commercial inputs are not significantly associated with yield.
The results of this study help us to identify some important non-tenure-related determinants of investment, input use, and yields. Most conspicuous among the catalysts to making fixed land improvements and the realization of higher yields are donor gardens. Labor is also identified as a key constraint to increasing production in Gambian agriculture (Carney; International Labour Organisation; Freudenberger; Roth, Carr, and Cochrane) , and seasonal labor shortages have intensified with the rise of migration and wage labor participation. The results suggest that access to household labor is an important catalyst to increasing yields. However, prospects for alleviating the labor problem through policy intervention are few. Introduction of labor-saving technology is beyond the financial means of the state and could present equity concerns.
Evidence also suggests that farmers with access to off-farm income are likely to make medium-or short-term investments in agriculture, but not so likely to make longer-term investments in a given plot. This conclusion jibes with DeCosse's (p. 20) vision of Gambian farmers as " [treating] their agricultural holdings as a means of providing for a bit of food security," but looking to off-farm opportunities for more substantial income.
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